Working with intersubjectivity

a self-disclosure

Abstract

The author maintains that the intersubjective perspective introduces radical changes into the clinical practice as the axis moves from the psychoanalysis of a single person to that of two people in a dynamic analytical field. He suggests that this displacement may deepen the understanding of conflicts that are being experienced. He considers that authenticity is a value to be claimed and is one of the central aspects of the psychoanalyst’s therapeutic ability. He mentions, via a clinical illustration, self-disclosure as an example. In clinical terms, he stresses how feelings of annihilation of the patient’s self can be observed, these being related to conflicts from his primitive childhood that have managed to surface following the analyst’s intervention. He draws the attention to certain myths encountered in the psychoanalytical community, which lead the analyst to believe that his daily clinical practice may easily generate the embarrassing feeling that his work is shallow, that the analysis was not well performed, etc. He believes that the same that occurs in an infant occurs in the therapist in training: the latter attributes shortcomings to himself in order to preserve ties with the “psychoanalytical family”, which is necessary for professional formation and for his insertion into the world of labor. He asserts, from an intersubjectivity perspective, that there is not only one “correct answer” with respect to the self-disclosure issue or to other issues that usually are designated as technical ones. Specific decisions about self-disclosure and other issues of analytical conduct must be made starting with an assessment of how much such conduct may make it possible for the duo to learn from the experience and manage to evolve emotionally. Finally, he believes that more careful observation may envisage a ubiquitous overlapping, in all psychoanalytical theories, between the intersubjective model and the classical one, as each of them seeks to capture different aspects of mental functioning in a dialectical tension, in which the border between the consensual truth data and the subjective construct oscillates continuously as a result from the floating intertwinement between the individual under analysis and the analyst. Under this perspective, he calls into question whether it is possible to value any analytical change in a patient without this corresponding to a change in the analyst.